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The Michigan Supreme Court Diminishes the
Right to Trail by Jury in Civil Cases

Robert A. Sedler

Abstract: In this paper, I have analyzed the right to trial by jury in civil cases as reflected
in decisions of the Michigan Supreme Court over approximately a 20 year period dealing
with three areas affecting the right to trial by jury in civil cases: (1) entitlement to a jury
trial; (2) summary disposition; and (3) directed verdicts. The study was constructed to
cover cases over a substantial period of time, so that it would be possible to analyze
whether the changing composition of the Michigan Supreme Court, beginning in the late
1990's, impacted on the Court’s decisions in these three areas.
The conclusion that emerges is that the Court, as currently constituted, has
diminished the right to trial by jury in civil cases in Michigan. The Court is more inclined
than it was prior to 1999 to hold in more cases that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, justifying summary disposition, and has now heard cases in which it has held that
the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict. And the fact that the Court is more inclined
to uphold the granting of summary disposition and directed verdicts is likely to have a
demonstrable impact on these kinds of cases when they are presented to the Court of
Appeals and the trial courts. These courts, following the precedents of the Supreme Court
and the results of the cases coming before that Court, will be more likely to rule in favor
of granting motions for summary disposition and motions for directed verdicts.
Given the Court's view of the diminished role of the jury in resolving factual
disputes in civil cases, litigating lawyers must make the best of a bad situation and do
everything that they can in order to protect the right to trial by jury in civil cases. They
must try to ensure in the early stages of the litigation that their cases are strong enough to
survive a motion for summary disposition and get to the jury, and at the trial they must
make a determined effort to present sufficient evidence to survive a directed verdict.
Hopefully the Court's view of the diminished role of the jury will not have dealt a fatal
blow to the right to trial by jury in civil cases in Michigan. Time will tell how well the
lawyers of Michigan have succeeded in preserving this fundamental constitutional right.
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THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT DIMINISHES THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IN
CIVIL CASES
by Professor Robert A. Sedler
Wayne State University Law School
I. Introduction

A number of lawyers in Michigan, who represent both plaintiffs and defendants in
civil litigation, have expressed concerns about the right to trial by jury in Michigan. They
have the impression that many cases are ended at the summary disposition stage. They
also have the impression that this trend has increased in the last decade after the
composition of the Court changed to a conservative majority. In response to this
expression of concern, I decided to undertake a study of the right to trial by jury in civil
cases in Michigan. I was able to obtain funding to engage a student research assistant
to do the necessary research for this study.

The study involved analyzing decisions of the Michigan Supreme Court over
approximately a 20 year period dealing with three areas affecting the right to trial by jury
in civil cases: (1) entitlement to a jury trial; (2) summary disposition; and (3) directed
verdicts. The student research assistant, Ms. Andrea Montbriand, a third year law
student at Wayne State University, did an outstanding job in reviewing and summarizing
all the decisions of the Michigan Supreme Court in these three areas. At my direction,
she collected all the cases referring to jury trial in civil cases, summary disposition, and
directed verdicts. This extensive research ensured that we would not overlook any
cases that could be relevant to the subject of the study. From the large number of cases
she collected, I selected only those that directly bore on the right to trial by jury. A
number of cases involving summary disposition were not used in the study, because
they involved essentially questions of law that were raised and decided on a motion for
summary disposition. The summary disposition cases that were selected for the study
were primarily those where there was no issue as to the applicable law, so that the
question before the Court was whether or not there was a genuine issue of material
fact, either entitling the moving party to summary disposition or entitling the non-moving
party to proceed to trial before a jury. 1
1

In a few of these cases, the Court ruled that as a matter of law the plaintiff could not
recover against the defendant, while the dissenting Justices, taking a different view of the
applicable law,argued that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding the granting of

1
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summary disposition.

2

The study was constructed to cover cases over a substantial period of time, so
that it would be possible to analyze whether the changing composition of the Michigan
Supreme Court, beginning in the late 1990's, impacted on the Court=s decisions in these
three areas. For this reason, the cases in each of the three areas, are discussed in
chronological order, with the earlier cases being discussed first. It may be noted in this
regard that there were far-reaching changes in substantive tort law during this period
that had the effect of limiting defendants= tort liability and making it more difficult for
plaintiffs to succeed in torts cases. As a result fewer tort cases would be brought, and of
those that were, there would be more cases where the defendant would be entitled to
summary disposition on the ground that there was no genuine issue of material fact as
to the defendant=s liability. To take one example, as the Court expanded the scope of
the open and obvious doctrine, which limits defendants= liability in premises liability
cases, 2 there would be more cases where the defendant was entitled to summary
disposition, because there would not be a genuine issue of material fact with respect to
the Aopen and obvious@ nature of the defect in the premises. Likewise, after the Court
broadly interpreted the tort exemption provision of the Michigan No-Fault Act in Kreiner
v. Fischer, 3 to limit the automobile accident victim to no-fault recovery unless the victim
could demonstrate Aserious impairment of bodily function affecting the general ability to
lead a normal life,@ many fewer automobile accident tort cases would be brought. And
since the Kreiner test is so strict, summary disposition would be proper in a number of
the automobile accident cases that were brought, on the ground that the plaintiff could
not satisfy the Ainability to lead a normal life@ test. In other words, to the extent that the
Court, by its decisions in tort cases, and the Legislature, by the enactment of tort reform
legislation, have significantly limited tort liability in Michigan, it follows that fewer tort
cases will be brought, and that in those that have been brought, more will end in
summary disposition for the defendant on the ground that there is no genuine issue of
material fact with respect to the existence of liability.
I will review all of the cases involving these three areas affecting the right to trial
by jury in civil cases. I will then posit some observations and conclusions from my
review of the cases.

Il. The Cases
2

See e.g., Riddle v. McClouth Steel Products Corp., 440 Mich 85; 485 NW2d 676

3

Kreiner v. Fischer, 471 Mich 109; NW2d (2004).

(1992).

3

A. Entitlement to a Jury Trial
Comparatively few cases arising during the time period of the study have
involved this issue. For the most part the issue arose in the context of the Court
deciding whether a particular matter was a question of law for the court or a question of
fact for the jury.
In Mull v. Abbott Laboratories, 4 the plaintiffs filed a products liability claim against
a drug manufacturer. The undisputed facts showed that the three year statute of
limitations for product liability claims had run. The plaintiff had argued that the question
of whether the statute of limitations had run was necessarily a question for the jury,
precluding the grant of summary disposition on this issue. The Court disagreed, holding
that in the absence of disputed facts, the question of whether the statute of limitations
had run is a question of law for the court. The Court emphasized that the right to trial by
jury did not prevent the courts from deciding that there was no question of fact to be
determined by the jury and so ruling on the issue as a matter of law. 5
In Charles Reinhart Co. v. Winiemko, 6 the lawyer for the losing party in a
damages action failed to timely file his brief on appeal and failed to take other actions
necessary to prosecute the appeal. This resulted in a malpractice action against the
4

444 Mich 1; 506 NW2d 816 (1993).

5

At that time, the Court had interpreted the statute of limitations as running from the
time the plaintiff could reasonably be expected to be aware of the injury, and the dissenting
Justices argued that the facts regarding the date that the plaintiffs were aware of their injuries
were susceptible to various inferences, so that it was a question for the jury whether the plaintiffs
exercised due diligence. The Michigan Supreme Court has recently abolished the discovery rule
in statute of limitations cases, see Trentadue v. Gorton, 2007 Mich LEXIS 1622, July 25, 2007,
so in all cases it is now a question for the Court whether the statute of limitations has run.
6

444 Mich 579, 313 NW2d 773 (1994).

4

lawyer in which the element of proximate cause depended on the likelihood of success
on appeal. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Riley, held that in a legal malpractice
action alleging negligence the question of proximate cause was a question for the court
rather than the jury. The Court said that the right to a jury trial was not infringed when
the court evaluated the legal merits of an appeal in a legal malpractice action, because
determining the likely success of an appeal depended on an analysis of legal doctrine
and procedural rules, an analysis that was beyond the competence of the jury. Justices
Brickley and Levin dissented on the ground that there were factual questions for the jury
to determine, such as what was the state of the law at the time of the acts in question,
and as how the law applied to the facts of the legal malpractice claim.
In the consolidated cases of Trivis v. Dreis and Krump Manufacturing Co and
Golec v. Metal Exchange Corporation,. 7 the Court dealt with jury trial questions relating
to the intentional tort exception to the Worker=s Disability Compensation Act. The Court,
in an opinion by Justice Boyle, held that whether the facts alleged in the complaint were
sufficient to constitute an intentional tort within the meaning of the Act=s exception was a
question of law for the court, but whether the facts alleged were in fact true was a
question for the jury. 8 In contrast, in Fire Insurance Exchange v. Diehl, 9 the Court dealt
with the intentional acts exclusion from coverage under an insurance policy, where the
act was committed by a 7 year old child. The child performed sexual acts on a younger
child, the victim=s mother sued the insured, and the insurer claimed it had no duty to
defend or indemnify the insured because of the intentional acts exclusion in the policy.
The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Brickley, held that it would not rule that as a
matter of law, the exclusion applied, and that it was a question of fact for the jury
whether the child had the intent to harm the victim. Justices Riley, Boyle and Weaver
dissented on the ground that on the facts of this case, intent to injure should be inferred
as a matter of law.
With respect to interpretation of contracts, where the terms of the contract are
clear, the application of the contract to the undisputed facts is a question of law for the
Court. But where the terms of the contract are ambiguous, the interpretation of the
contract=s ambiguous language is a question of fact to be decided by the jury on the
basis of extrinsic evidence. 10 In cases brought under the Whistleblowers Act, the right to
7

453 Mich 149; 551 NW2d 132 (1996).

8

In Trivis the Court held that the facts were insufficient to show intent to injure. Justices
Levin and Cavanagh dissented in Trivis. In Golec, the Court held that the facts were sufficient to
show intent in that the employer disregarded actual knowledge that an injury was certain to
occur. Justices Riley, Brickley and Weaver dissented in Golec.
9

450 Mich 678; 545 N.W.2d 602 (1996).

10

Klapp v. United Insurance Group Agency, 468 Mich. 459; 663 NW2d 447 (2003).
5

trial by jury has been specifically authorized by the legislature, so the Court did not have
to decide whether the constitutional right to trial by jury applies to these cases. 11

11

Anzaldua v. Rudolph, 457 Mich 530; 578 NW2d 306 (1998).

6

In the most recent case involving the constitutional right to trial by jury, Phillips v.
Mirac,Inc., 12 the Court has held that the right to trial by jury is not violated by the
statutory imposition of caps on damages. The Court majority, in an opinion by Justice
Taylor, reasoned that the statute only limited the consequences of the jury=s finding of
liability and that under the statute the amount that the plaintiff receives was not within
the purview of the jury. The dissent by Justices Cavanagh and Kelly argued that since
the damages cap was applied automatically without regard to the jury=s assessment of
damages, the damages cap violated the right to trial by jury.
B. Summary Disposition
My analysis of the cases will be divided into the periods pre-1999, and post1999, using 1999 as the point where the composition of the Michigan Supreme Court
changed to a conservative majority. 13 The analysis will state the Court=s holding on
12

470 Mich 415; 685 NW2d 174 (2004).

13

The conservative majority, as I have defined it, consists of Justices Weaver, Taylor,
Corrigan, Young and Markman, although in recent years Justice Weaver has disassociated
herself from that majority and in some cases has voted with Justices Cavanagh and Kelly. Justice
Weaver was elected in 1994. Justice Taylor was appointed by Governor John Engler in 1997 and
elected in 1998. Justice Corrigan was appointed by Governor Engler in 1999 and elected in
2000. Justice Markman was appointed by Governor Engler in 1999 and elected in 2000. Justice
Young was appointed by Governor Engler in 1999 and elected in 2002. The pre-1999 period for

7

whether or not there was a genuine issue of material fact in the particular case and will
state the contrary position of any dissenting Justices. In addition to these cases, I have
done an analysis of in lieu of leave cases involving questions of summary disposition for
the years 2005-2007, ending in the summer of 2007.
Pre-1999
Velmer v. Baraga Area Schools 14
A student was injured while working on a milling machine during metal shop class
at the Baraga area schools. The school asserted governmental immunity. The plaintiff
tried to bring the claim within the public building exception to governmental immunity.
Deposition testimony showed that the machine was very large and had not been bolted
or permanently affixed to the floor. The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Riley, held
that the dangerous or defective condition of a fixture, without regard to whether it is
actually or constructively attached to the floor, could support a claim of liability under the
public building exception to governmental immunity. The Court further held that there
was a factual question as to whether the particular machine constituted a fixture,
rendering summary disposition inappropriate. Justice Griffin dissented on the ground
purposes of this study begins in 1988. At that time, the Justices of the Court were as follows:
Justice Brickley, elected in 1982; Justice Griffin, elected in 1986; Justice Riley, elected in 1982;
Justice Levin, elected in 1972; Justice Archer, appointed by Governor Blanchard in 1986;
Justice Cavanagh, elected in 1982; and Justice Boyle, appointed by Governor Blanchard in 1984,
and elected in 1988. Justice Levin was replaced by Justice Kelly, elected in 1996. Justice Archer
was replaced by Justice Mallet, who was appointed by Governor Blanchard in 1990, and elected
in 1996. Justice Mallet was replaced by Justice Young. Justice Riley was replaced by Justice
Taylor. Justice Boyle was replaced by Justice Corrigan; Justice Brickley was replaced by Justice
Markman. Of the Members of the current Court, only Justice Cavanagh was on the Court during
the entire period covered by this study.
14

430 Mich 385; 424 NW2d 770 (1988).

8

that as a matter of law, the milling machine did not constitute a fixture.
Bullock v. Automobile Club of Michigan

15

This was an action for breach of an employment contract, in which the plaintiff
alleged that as a consequence of the employer=s breach of express oral promises, the
plaintiff lost a job that was guaranteed for a lifetime and in which he was told he would
be able to earn large commissions. The employer moved for summary disposition on
the ground that the plaintiff continued his employment after the employer changed its
employment manual with respect to minimum production requirements and that the
plaintiff failed to meet those requirements. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Boyle,
held that the motion should be denied on the ground that there was a genuine issue of
material fact as to the effect of the change in the manuals on the plaintiff=s claim of an
oral promise of continued employment based on the pre-existing policy. Justice Griffin
and Chief Justice Riley dissented on the ground that the allegations of the complaint
were insufficient as a matter of law to provide a basis for an employment contract that
was not terminable at will.
Polkow v. Citizens Insurance Co. of America 16
The insured brought an action against the insurer to determine coverage for
groundwater contamination under a comprehensive general liability policy. The
insurance contract contained a pollution-exclusion clause with an exception for a
discharge was that was Asudden and accidental.@ The insurer invoked the pollutionexclusion clause to avoid a duty to defend, and the insured argued that the discharge
that was the basis of the suit against it was Asudden and accidental.@ There was some
evidence in the depositions that there had been frequent spillage over the years during
the transfer process from the tanker truck to underground tanks, so that the trier of fact
could conclude that the insured Aexpected@ the release of the contaminants. But there
was also some evidence in the depositions that the contaminants in issue were not from
those oil leaks and may have been unrelated to the insured=s operations. The Court, in
15

16

432 Mich 472;444 NW2d 114 (1989).

438 Mich 174; 476 NW2d 382 (1991).

7

an opinion by Chief Justice Cavanagh, held that without proof of the source of the
discharge, it could not be determined whether the discharge fell within the pollution
exclusion clause, or whether there was an unknown source of the discharge that
brought the case within the Asudden and accidental@ exception to the exclusion clause.
The Court went on to hold that this uncertainty created doubt as to coverage, rendering
summary disposition inappropriate. Justices Riley, Mallett, and Griffin dissented on the
ground that the undisputed facts showed that the discharge was due to the spillage, so
that the pollution exclusion clause applied.
McKart v. J. Walter Thompson USA,Inc. 17
In a wrongful discharge claim by a high-ranking executive of an advertising
agency, the employer had informed the plaintiff that his position was being eliminated as
part of a workforce reduction. The employer conceded that the plaintiff had an oral
contract of permanent employment terminable only for cause, and contended that the
workforce reduction constituted cause. The plaintiff contended that his discharge was
for personal reasons, but did not introduce any evidence to this effect in opposition to
the employer=s motion for summary disposition. This being so, the Court, in an opinion
by Chief Justice Cavanagh, held that summary disposition was properly granted. Justice
Levin dissented on the ground that the true reason for the plaintiff=s discharge was in
issue and that this presented a question of fact for the jury.
Trager v. Thor

18

This case involved a claim of liability for a dogbite against a person in temporary
possession of the dog. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Boyle, held that liability could
be imposed on the basis of negligence. There was evidence that the caretaker knew
that the dog had bitten a child prior to this incident, but there also was evidence that the
owner put the dog in a back bedroom, thus satisfying his duty to the plaintiffs, and
evidence that in the prior incident the dog had been provoked. The Court held that
summary disposition on the negligence claim was improper, because the allegations
17

18

437 Mich 109; 469 NW2d 284 (1991).

453 Mich 149; 551 NW2d 132 (1996).

8

were sufficient to enable the trier of fact to find that the caretaker accepted responsibility
for the care of the child while the child was in his home and had been negligent in
allowing the child to be exposed to an animal with known dangerous propensities.
Owens v. Auto Club Insurance Association 19
In a no-fault claim involving coordinated, benefits from Veterans Administration,
the Court, in an opinion by Justice Levin, reversed a grant of partial summary
disposition for the claimant. The Court held that there was a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the insured sought to obtain outpatient services from the Veterans
Administration and whether it was necessary for him to remain at in-patient facility for
the entire two year period.

19

444 Mich 314; 506 NW2d 850 (1993)

9

Skinner v. Square D Company

20

This was a products liability case brought against the manufacturer of a switch
that the decedent had installed on his homemade tumbling machine. The decedent was
electrocuted while using the machine. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Levin, held
that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the alleged defect in the
switch could have caused the decedent=s death, so that summary disposition for the
defendant was proper. The Court found that the plaintiff=s evidence did not afford a
reliable basis from which reasonable minds could infer that it was more probable than
not that but for the defect in the switch, the decedent could have been electrocuted.
Justice Levin dissented on this point.
Bertrand v. Alan Ford,Inc. and Maurer v. Oakland County Parks and Recreation
Department 21
These consolidated cases involved the application of the open and obvious
doctrine. In Maurer, the plaintiff alleged that as she was leaving a rest room area in a
county park, she fell on an unmarked stone step. She further alleged that the county
was negligent in failing to mark the step with a contrasting color, and by failing to warn
of the additional step. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Cavanagh, held that the
plaintiff failed to establish anything unusual about the step that would take it out from
under the open and obvious doctrine, so that summary disposition for the county was
proper. Justice Levin dissented on this point. In Bertrand, the plaintiff fell backwards off
a step at the defendant=s place of business and alleged that the defendant breached its
duty to maintain reasonably safe premises by failing to place a guardrail along the step
or to post a sign warning of the step down. The Court held that while there was no
genuine issue of material fact that the danger of falling was open and obvious, there
was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the construction of the step, when
considered with the placement of the vending machines and the cashier=s window,
along with the hinging of the door, created an unreasonable risk of harm despite the
obviousness of the danger of falling off the step. Here, because of this awkward
placement, the plaintiff was forced to step backwards after holding the door open for
others, and lost her balance and fell. Justice Weaver dissented on this point.

20

445 Mich 153; 516 NW2d 475 (1994).

21

449 Mich 606; 537 NW2d 185 (1995).

10

Champion v. Nationwide Security 22
In this case an employee brought an action against the employer under the
Michigan Civil Rights Act for quid pro quo sexual harassment, resulting in her
constructive discharge. The basis of her claim was that she was raped by her
supervisor after her refusal to submit to the supervisor=s sexual requests. The Court of
Appeals granted the employer=s motion for summary disposition on the ground that the
employer was not liable under the Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Brickley, that the employer is liable for such rapes where they
were accomplished through the use of the supervisor=s managerial powers. The Court
also held that the employer had made sufficient admissions to establish liability under
this rule, and so ordered the trial court render summary disposition for the plaintiff
under MCR 2.116(I)(2). 23 Justice Boyle, joined by Justices Levin and Cavanagh,
concurred in the ruling on the legal question, but would have remanded the case to the
trial court with directions to make findings to determine whether, on the state of the
record, the plaintiff was entitled to summary disposition.
Sanchez v. Michigan Department of Mental Health24
In this case a patient committed suicide after having been involuntarily admitted
to a state psychiatric hospital. A claim based on negligent supervision would be barred
by governmental immunity, but a true building defect claim would come within the
public building exception to governmental immunity. The claim was that the defendant
failed to design the restroom in a manner that would allow proper supervision of
patients. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Boyle, first held that the plaintiffs were not
22

450 Mich 702; 545 NW2d 596 (1996).

23

Under this rule, if it appears to the court that the opposing party rather than the moving
party is entitled to summary disposition, the court may render judgment in favor of the opposing
party.
24

455 Mich 83; 565 NW2d 358 (1997).

11

required to negate a claim of negligent supervision in order to assert their building
defect claim. The Court then held that the allegations of the complaint were sufficient to
allege a building defect claim, so that the grant of summary disposition to the state was
improper. Justices Riley and Weaver dissented on the ground that the allegations of the
complaint were not sufficient to allege a building defect claim.
Town v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co. and McConnell v. Rollins Burdick Hunter 25
These were consolidated cases involving the question of whether the plaintiffs
presented sufficient evidence of age or sex discrimination to overcome a motion for
summary disposition. In Town a woman sought a transfer from her position, and was
granted a transfer as a market administrator after she turned town a position with the
assessment center upon learning of the center=s schedule. A year later, her supervisor
notified her that she was being transferred to the assessment center because her
position was being consolidated with that of another manager. The person who held the
other position left the company. A 35 year old male assumed the consolidated position.
The plaintiff, who was 49 years old, resigned from the company, because the
assessment center=s schedule was incompatible with her personal situation. She
alleged age and gender discrimination. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Brickley,
held that the employer=s motion for summary disposition should be granted on the
ground that the employer had advanced a nondiscriminatory explanation for the
transfer, and that the plaintiff=s evidence did not create a genuine issue of material fact
regarding whether this nondiscriminatory explanation was a pretext for age or gender
discrimination. In McConnnell, the plaintiff was hired when he was 55 years old, and a
year into his employment, he was informed that he needed to improve his sales
production. He failed to do so and was discharged. He claimed age discrimination on
the ground that his replacement, a much younger person, was held to a different
standard. However, his replacement was paid much less than the plaintiff and
generated sales in an amount that was twice her smaller salary, while the plaintiff=s
sales failed to cover his salary. In addition, the plaintiff had been hired and fired by the
same person in a relatively short period of time. The Court again held that the plaintiff
failed to present sufficient evidence that his age was a determining factor in the
employer=s decision to terminate him, so that the employer was entitled to summary
disposition. Justices Mallet, Cavanagh, and Kelly dissented in Town, saying that the
evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the employer had discriminated against
the plaintiff.

25

455 Mich 688; 568 NW2d 64 (1997).

12

Sewell v. Southfield Public Schools 26
The plaintiff was injured in high school swimming class alleged that school
maintained a dangerous and defective swimming pool, so as to come within the public
building exception to the governmental immunity doctrine. The plaintiff alleged and
produced supporting affidavits showing that the pool depth markers were mismarked,
that the pool floor was uneven, that the pool depth was less than the 5 feet it was
supposed to be, and that unlike most pools, this pool had an upslope near where a
person might dive. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Cavanagh, held that the
allegations and affidavit were sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact with
respect to the public building exception, precluding the grant of summary disposition to
the public school.

26

456 Mich 670; 576 NW2d 153 (1998).

13

Vargo v. Sauer 27
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Brickley, held that state university=s medical
residency program at private hospital was not a Ahospital@ within the hospital exception
to governmental tort immunity. However, the Court then held there was a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether a medical school professor who instructed residents and
treated private patients at the private hospital was simultaneously operating both as an
agent of the university and of the private hospital, thereby precluding summary
disposition in favor of professor on issue of whether he was entitled to governmental
immunity.
Lytle v. Malady 28
The plaintiff, who was terminated from her employment, claimed that she had a
justification of Ajust cause@ employment and also claimed that her termination was due
to her gender. The employer claimed that her discharge was due to a reduction in force.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Weaver, held that summary disposition should be
granted to the employer on both counts. On the Ajust cause@ employment claim, the
Court noted that the language of the employer handbook stated that the contents did
not establish any contract between employer and employee. As to the discrimination
claim, the Court noted that the plaintiff could not show that she was treated differently
from other employees, since the two new employees hired were not similarly situated to
her in terms of job qualifications and functions. The Court also said that the employer
submitted evidence of a dire economic forecast that led to the reduction in force. Justice
Brickley, in a concurrence, took the position that the plaintiff had failed to raise a
genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether the employer had just cause to
terminate the plaintiff as part of its reduction in force. Justices Cavanagh and Kelly
dissented, saying that reasonable minds could differ as to the reading of the employee
handbook and that evidence of conflict between the plaintiff and her supervisor was
sufficient to raise a question of fact with respect to plaintiff=s claim of gender
discrimination. Chief Justice Mallett agreed with Justices Cavanagh and Kelley with
respect to the gender discrimination claim.
Morales v. Auto-Owners Insurace Co. 29
27

457 Mich 49; 576 NW2d 656 (1998)

28

458 Mich 153; 579 NW2d 906 (1998).

29

458 NW2d 288; 582 NW2d 776 (1998).

14

The no-fault auto insurer and the insured had a relationship over a six year
period in which the insured would regularly fall behind in his payments, the insurer
would send a notice of intent to cancel, and the insured would pay the balance owed
before the cancellation date. In this case, there was a dispute as to whether the policy
had been cancelled before the insurer was involved in a serious accident. The Court, in
an opinion by Justice Cavanagh, held that collateral estoppel applied against the insurer
in this case, and that there were genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether
the insurer complied with the policy=s notice provision and whether the insured
reasonably relied on the reinstatement notice in not seeking other insurance. Justices
Taylor and Weaver dissented on the ground that collateral estoppel should not be
applied in this case.

1999-2007
Clark v. United Technologies Automotive 30
The defendants owned a die casting corporation and a circuit board part
manufacturing plant. The plaintiff performed work for both businesses and was injured
while working at the manufacturing plant when a power punch press machine
malfunctioned. He obtained workers compensation from the die casting corporation and
then brought a tort action against the manufacturing plant. The defendants moved for
summary disposition on the ground that the plaintiff was employed by both companies,
and so precluded from bring a tort action against his employer. The Court, in an opinion
by Justice Taylor, held that whether the plaintiff was also an employee of the
manufacturing plant was a question of fact for the jury, precluding summary disposition
for the employer in the tort action. The Court found that the plaintiff presented evidence
that the two businesses were operated as two separate companies, while the
defendants presented conflicting evidence that under the economic realities test the
manufacturing company was a co-employer of the plaintiff.
Smith v. Global Life Insurance Co. 31
In a suit for breach of contract under a life insurance policy, the Court, in an
opinion by Justice Young, held that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the
insured had misrepresented his health in the insurance application. In the application,
30

459 Mich 681; 594 NW2d 447 (1999).

31

460 Mich 446; 597 NW2d 28 (1999).

15

the insured stated that he did not have a court condition, and the insurer submitted
medical records showing that he had been diagnosed with coronary heart disease six
years before he applied for the policy. The Court also held that it was not necessary for
the insurer to show that it relied on the misrepresentations in issuing the policy. Justices
Kelly and Cavanagh dissented on this point. Finally, the Court then held that private
actions against the insurer arising out of misconduct made unlawful by the Insurance
Code are permitted by the Michigan Consumer Protection Act.
Foster v. Cone-Blanchard Machine Co. 32
The case involved a design defect claim against the corporate purchaser of the
assets of the corporate manufacturer of an allegedly defective feed screw machine for
injuries sustained while the plaintiff was using the machine. The plaintiff had settled with
the predecessor, and the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Weaver, held that this
settlement made the continuity of enterprise theory of successor liability inapplicable.
With respect to summary disposition, the Court held that the plaintiff did not produce
sufficient evidence showing a relationship between the successor corporation and the
plaintiff=s employer or that the successor employer was actually aware of the alleged
design defect in the type of machine owned by the plaintiff=s employer. Justices
Brickley, Cavanagh and Kelly dissented on both issues. With respect to summary
disposition, they pointed out that the evidence showed that the successor corporation
had access to the predecessor=s customer lists and that the plaintiff=s employer
possessed a business card of the successor corporation on the premises. They
maintained that this evidence was sufficient to raise a question as to whether the
successor corporation had knowledge of the defect in the predecessor=s machine and
that it had been in contact with the plaintiff=s employer about the machine in question.
They emphasized that on a motion for summary disposition, the Court was required to
look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. The majority took the
position that all that this evidence showed was that the successor corporation was
soliciting business from the plaintiff=s employer, and that this showing was insufficient to
raise a question as to the successor corporation=s knowledge of the alleged defect.
Maiden v. Rozwood and Reno v. Chung 33
These consolidated cases involved the quantum of proof necessary to survive a
motion for summary disposition in gross negligence actions against governmental
employees. In Maiden, the decedent was a resident at a state mental health facility.
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When he became physically and verbally abusive, an aide escorted him back to the
building, where he began knocking over furniture and throwing things and attempted to
bite the aides who were trying to restrain him. The aides held him down for 5 minutes.
He died shortly thereafter due to positional asphyxia. The Court, in an opinion by Justice
Corrigan, held that the plaintiff=s proofs in opposition to the defendants= motion for
summary disposition failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the employees=
conduct was so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether
injury would result. Justices Kelly, Cavanagh and Brickley dissented on the ground that
the plaintiff presented evidence that the employees violated their training procedures for
subduing a patient, knowing the possible consequences, and that this evidence was
sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to gross negligence.
In Reno, the Court found that there was sufficient evidence that a medical
examiner was grossly negligent in concluding that a dying murder victim was unable to
speak. That conclusion contributed to the plaintiff=s being charged with the victim=s
murder, since the plaintiff=s claim that the victim identified another person as her killer
was disregarded. The Court held, however, that the medical examiner did not owe a
duty to a person charged with a crime, so that the medical examiner was not
substantively liable for the gross negligence. Justices Kelly, Brickley, and Cavanagh
dissented on this point.
Hall v. Consolidated Rail Corporation 34
This was a per curiam decision. In a train crossing accident, the issue was
whether the crossing signals were working. The railroad presented uncontradicted
evidence that the signals were working the day before the accident. The Court held that
there was no genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether the railroad had
notice of the signals not working, so that the railroad was entitled to summary
disposition.
Michalski v. Bar-Levav 35
In an action brought under the Handicappers Civil Rights Act (HCRA), the plantiff
claimed that she had been discharged after she informed her employer that she had
been tentatively diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. The employer claimed that he was
unaware of her medical condition until she left the employment. The Court, in an opinion
by Justice Weaver, held that under HCRA, the employee must be regarded as presently
having a physical or mental characteristic that substantially limits one or more life
activities. The Court went on to hold that the evidence showed that the plaintiff was
capable of performing her job duties and that there was no evidence that the employer
34
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regarded her as unable to perform the tasks of ordinary life. Therefore, the Court held,
the employer was entitled to summary disposition on the plaintiff=s HCRA claim. Justices
Kelly and Cavanagh dissented, contending that there was sufficient evidence to raise a
genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether the employer discriminated
against the plaintiff because she thought the plaintiff was handicapped, and that, if true,
this would establish a violation of HCRA.
Haliw v. City of Sterling Heights 36
The plaintiff claimed that she slipped and fell on a patch of ice that had formed in
a depression on sidewalk, and tried to bring her case within the highway exception to
governmental immunity. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Markman, held that the
plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that the claimed depression was the proximate
cause of her fall. Thus, the reason for her fall was the accumulation of ice on the
sidewalk, and the highway exception was inapplicable. Justices Kelly and Cavanagh
dissented on the ground that there were genuine issues of material fact relating to
whether the claimed depression in the sidewalk rendered the sidewalk no longer
reasonably safe, whether the ice or snow on which the plaintiff fell was a Anatural
accumulation,@ and whether the plaintiff=s injuries were proximately caused by the
sidewalk=s condition
Oade v. Jackson National Life Insurance Co. 37
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Young, held that the insured=s failure to
inform the insurer of hospitalization for chest pains between the time of application and
the time of delivery of the policy was a Amaterial misrepresentation@ within the meaning
of the statute permitting the insurer to avoid the policy for a Amaterial
misrepresentation.@ This being so, the insurer was entitled to summary disposition.
Justices Kelley and Cavanagh, dissented on the ground that a genuine issue of material
fact existed as to whether the representations were Amaterial,@ since the plaintiff
proffered evidence that his health did not change in any way between the date he
applied for the insurance policy and the date it was delivered. The majority countered
this point by contending that since there was no dispute that at a minimum, the insurer
would have charged a higher rate had this fact been known, the misrepresentation was
Amaterial@ within the meaning of the statute.
Rose v National Auction Group,Inc. 38
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In a negligent auctioneer claim, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Taylor, held
that the plaintiffs= claims for breach of fiduciary duty were not supported by the
evidence, since the plaintiffs could not have reasonably believed that it was appropriate
to engage in a Ashill bidding@ scheme. Justices Cavanagh and Kelly dissented on the
ground that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the plaintiffs could
reasonably rely on the auctioneer to conduct the auction lawfully and as to whether the
auctioneer enticed the plaintiffs into the Ashill bidding scheme.@
Klapp v. United Insurance Agency,Inc. 39
An insurance agent brought suit against the insurance company, claiming that
under the employment contract, he was entitled to the vesting of a large number of his
renewals. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Markman, held that the grant of summary
disposition to the insurance company was improper, since there was an irreconcilable
conflict between the vesting schedule in the contract and the definition of retirement in
the agent=s manual. As a result, the language of the contract was ambiguous, and the
meaning of the contract was a question of fact, to be decided by the jury.
GC Timmis & Co. v. Guardian Alarm Co. 40
The plaintiff, a registered investment buyer, but not a licensed real estate broker,
entered into an oral contract under which the plaintiff would receive a Asuccess fee@ for
any company that the plaintiff contacted on the defendant=s behalf and that the
defendant subsequently purchased. When the plaintiff claimed a Asuccess fee,@ the
defendant contended that the plaintiff was precluded from bringing suit, because he was
an unlicensed real estate broker. The plaintiff contended that the transaction did not
involve real estate and so did not come within the Real Estate Brokers= Act (REBA). The
Court, in an opinion by Justice Markman, held that summary disposition in this case was
improper because (1) if the purchase did not involve a real estate transaction, there was
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether an oral contract existed, and (2) if the
purchase did involve a real estate transaction, there was a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the plaintiff Anegotiated@ the transaction. Justices Young and Weaver
dissented on the ground that REBA applied to the transaction in issue, precluding the
plaintiff=s suit for a Asuccess fee.@
Anderson v. Pine Knob Ski Resort,Inc. 41
A skier was injured when he lost his balance and collided with the timing shack.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Taylor, held that recovery was barred by the
39
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Michigan Ski Safety Act, which barred recovery for injury caused by a danger that was
obvious and necessary. This being so, the ski operator was entitled to summary
disposition. Justices, Cavanagh, Kelly and Weaver dissented on the ground that there
was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the necessity of the timing shack
and its location, as well as whether the placement of the timing shack near the finish
line of the racecourse at the bottom of the hill was Aobvious and necessary@ within the
meaning of the statute.
West v. General Motors Corporation 42
In a suit under the Whistleblowers Act, the plaintiff claimed that he was
discharged in retaliation for reporting to the police an alleged assault at the plant by a
union committee person. The employer discharged the plaintiff on the stated ground
that he had repeatedly violated the employer=s policies for reporting time worked. The
Court, in a per curiam opinion, held that the plaintiff had failed to introduce any evidence
showing a causal connection between the plaintiff=s discharge and his reporting of the
assault incident to the police. Justices Kelly and Cavanagh dissented on the ground that
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff actually
misrepresented the time worked on his timesheet. In addition, they maintained that if the
jury found that the plaintiff actually worked the time reported on the timesheet, and that
the discharge occurred after the report, these facts would be sufficient to support a
claim under the Whistleblowers Act.
Nastal v. Henderson & Associates Investigations,Inc. 43
In this case, the plaintiff, who had brought a negligence actionagainst an insured
driver, alleged stalking by private investigators employed by the insurance company to
conduct surveillance of the plaintiff. The surveillance continued after it had been
discovered by the plaintiff. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Taylor, held that the
defendant=s surveillance of the plaintiff after it had been discovered continued to serve a
legitimate purpose within the meaning of the Private Detective License Act, so that the
defendant was entitled to summary disposition on the plaintiff=s stalking claim. Justices
42
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Cavanagh and Kelly dissented on the ground that there was a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the surveillance served a legitimate purpose after it was discovered,
particularly in light of the manner in which the surveillance was conducted.
Wilson v. Alpena County Road Commission 44
In a negligence action against a county road commission, the county contended
that it was entitled to summary disposition on the ground that there was no genuine
issue of material fact as to whether it had notice of the claimed defect. The Court, in an
opinion by Justice Taylor, held that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to create
genuine issues of material fact concerning whether the deteriorated condition of the
road made the road not reasonably safe for public travel and whether the road
commission had actual or constructive notice of that fact at the time of the accident.

44

474 Mich 161; 713 NW2d 717 (2006).

21

Greene v. A. P. Products,Ltd. 45
In this products liability action, an unattended infant died when he ingested and
inhaled a bottle of hair oil. The bottle did not contain a warning that the product could be
harmful if ingested and that it should be kept out of the reach of small children. The
Court, in an opinion by Justice Corrigan, held that the manufacturer had no duty to warn
of this danger, because it was open and obvious to a reasonably prudent person.
Justice Cavanagh dissented on the ground that there was a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether ingesting the product posed a risk of death in addition to a risk of
illness. Justice Kelly dissented on the ground that there was a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether, in the absence of any warning, the plaintiff was aware of the specific
danger of serious harm or death.
The 2007 Leave to Appeal Cases
As of the summer, 2007, when this was study concluded, there were no
summary disposition cases that were decided by the Michigan Supreme Court with
published opinions. However, there were two cases involving questions of summary
disposition where the Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, reversed the decisions
of the Court of Appeals. In Lanzo Construction Co. v. Wayne Steel Erectors, 46 there
was an indemnity claim arising from an underlying injury accident. In considering the
motion for leave to appeal, the Court found that the victim=s negligence was at least
partially responsible for the accident, so that the indemnity plaintiff was not solely
responsible for the accident. This being so, the Court held that the indemnity plaintiff
was entitled to summary disposition on its claim for indemnity. In Banks v. EXXON
Mobile Corporation, 47 the plaintiff was injured at a gas station when the pump he was
using to put gasoline in his automobile burst and sprayed gasoline in his face. The
plaintiff sued the owner and manager of the gas station, and the Court of Appeals
granted the defendants= motion for summary disposition. The Michigan Supreme Court
held that based on the facts presented, a reasonable jury could conclude that the
defendants should have discovered the defect in the pump, and so reversed the grant of
summary disposition for the defendant.
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A Further Note: A Two-Year Analysis of In Lieu of Leave Cases Involving
Questions of Summary Disposition
Since the plan of the study involved analyzing only reported opinions of the
Michigan Supreme Court, the Court=s in lieu of leave decisions involving questions of
summary disposition were not included in the study. However, after looking at the two
decsions for 2007 discussed above, I decided to take a look at such decisions for the
two year period from 2005-2006 to get some sense of what the Court was doing in this
regard. Without going into detail about the decisions, 48 the research found there was
28 such decisions in this period, which seemed to me to be a surprisingly high number.
In 21 of the cases, the Court directed the entry of an order of summary disposition. In 5
of them the Court held that summary disposition was improperly granted, and in 2 of
them, the Court directed a reconsideration of the action of the Court of Appeals in
denying the defendant=s motion for summary disposition. In the cases where the Court
ordered summary disposition, 18 of the decisions were in favor of the defendant, and 3
were in favor of the plaintiff.
However, a number of these cases involved questions of substantive law, and so
are not directly relevant to our analysis. As best as could be determined by the
decisions of the Supreme Court, supplemented with looking to the unpublished
decisions of the Court of Appeals when available, 7 of the cases involved the matter of
whether the evidence was sufficient to present a genuine issue of material fact. In 6 of
the cases, the Court held that the evidence was not sufficient, and reversed the decision
of the Court of Appeal holding that the defendant=s motion for summary disposition
should be denied. In the seventh case, the Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in
granting the defendant=s motion for summary disposition.

C. Directed Verdicts
The research disclosed only 5 cases in this area, beginning in 2000. It may be
suggested that this reflects the fact that with the changing composition of the Court,
defendants were more inclined to file such motions and/or that motions for leave to
appeal from decisions of the Court of Appeals involving directed verdicts were more
likely to be granted by the Court.
Wilkinson v. Lee 49
48
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A year and a half after an automobile accident case, the accident victim was
diagnosed as having a meningioma brain tumor. The surgeon who removed the tumor
testified that it was a slow growing tumor and that it was likely that the plaintiff had the
tumor at the time of the accident. However, both he and the defendant=s medical
witness testified that the trauma to the plaintiff=s head could have caused the tumor to
grow or increase. The trial court denied the defendant=s motion for a directed verdict,
and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals held that the
defendants were entitled to a directed verdict. The Supreme Court held per curiam that
there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the accident was the proximate
cause of the injury, so that the grant of a directed verdict was improper.
Hord v. Environmental Research Institute of Michigan 50
The plaintiff accepted a job with the defendant organization and moved to
Michigan from New Jersey. He was laid off after one year and sued the organization,
alleging that the organization had misrepresented its financial health and that he would
not have accepted the position had he known the actual situation. The plaintiff=s
evidence showed that he was given an operating summary, which he claimed he took
as a representation of the financial status of the organization. The plaintiff also
introduced evidence that the director knew that the organization had some financial
problems. The trial court denied the organization=s motion for a directed verdict, and the
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court held per curiam that the
plaintiff=s evidence was insufficient to establish fraudulent misrepresentation or silent
fraud and ordered a directed vedict for the defendant. Justices Kelly and Cavanagh
dissented on the ground that the jurors faced a credibility contest between the director
and the plaintiff and could have found the facts sufficient to establish the plaintiff=s fraud
claims.
In re Estate of Karmey v, Karmey 51
The children of the decedent claimed that the beneficiary of the will, the
decedent=s second wife, had exercised undue influence over the decedent when he
made her the sole beneficiary of his estate. The probate judge ruled that the plaintiffs
had failed to present sufficient evidence of undue influence for the jury and directed a
verdict for the wife. The Court of Appeals applied a presumption of undue influence on
the ground that there was a fiduciary relationship between the decedent and his wife.
The Supreme Court held per curiam that the presumption of undue influence was not
applicable to the marriage relationship, and upheld the grant of the directed verdict for
the wife.
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Sniecinski v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan 52
The plaintiff claimed that the defendant failed to hire her due to her pregnancy.
The plaintiff had been employed as a telemarketing representative by a company that
merged with the Blue Cross Network. When she became pregnant, she experienced
problems that required her to take a medical leave for 7 months. After giving birth to a
child, she returned to employment with the Blue Cross Network. When she became
pregnant again, her supervisor asked her whether she would experience problems
again and informed her that she would not be permitted to use sick time or unpaid leave
because of her pregnancy. Plaintiff suffered a miscarriage and returned to work. At that
point the marketing department of the Blue Cross network merged with the marketing
department of Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan. All the Blue Cross Network
telemarketers were required to interview for an account representative position with
Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan. The plaintiff was offered the position and soon
became pregnant again. She again had to take medical leave because of her
pregnancy. Following a sequence of events, when the plaintiff was ready to return to
work, the account representative position previously offered to her was not filled due to
a hiring freeze. The Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan account representative position
required a college degree, which the plaintiff did not have. She was offered and
accepted a position as a marketing representative that was unrelated to her previous
work. In her suit claiming pregnancy discrimination, the jury found for the plaintiff, and
the trial court denied the defendant=s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Corrigan, held that the motion should have been
granted on the ground that the plaintiff failed to show a causal link between her
pregnancy and the defendant=s failure to hire her as an account representative. Justices
Weaver and Kelly dissented on the ground that the evidence supported the inference
that the defendant=s failure to hire her was causally related to her pregnancy.

52

469 Mich 124; 666 NW2d 186 (2003).

25

Elezovic v. Ford Motor Co, 53
The plaintiff brought a sexual harassment suit against her supervisor and her
employer, contending that her supervisor engaged in sexual harassment by exposing
himself to her while masturbating and by other conduct. The Court held that the
supervisor was individually liable. With respect to her claim against her employer, the
trial court and the Court of Appeals held that the employer was entitled to a directed
verdict, because the plaintiff did not introduce sufficient evidence showing that the
employer had notice of the harassing conduct. The plaintiff=s evidence consisted of her
telling two other supervisors in confidence about one incidence of the alleged conduct
and her mentioning Aharassment@ and Ahostile environment@ in letters to the employer.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Taylor, held that the evidence was
insufficient and affirmed the granting of a directed judgment to the employer. Justices
Weaver, Cavanagh and Kelly dissented on this point, contending that the evidence
presented by the plaintiff was sufficient to raise a question of notice to the employer.

III. Observations and Conclusions
The purpose of this study was to analyze the current status of the right to trial by
jury in civil cases in Michigan. The study involved analyzing decisions of the Michigan
Supreme Court over approximately a 20 year period dealing with three areas affecting
the right to trial by jury in civil cases: (1) entitlement to a jury trial; (2) summary
disposition; and (3) directed verdicts.
The law respecting entitlement to a jury trial seems well-settled. Comparatively
few cases arising during the time period of the study have involved this issue. The
Court=s decisions in these cases establish fairly clear guidelines as to what constitutes a
question of law for the Court and what constitutes a question of fact for the jury. In my
opinion, these guidelines do not significantly erode the right to trial by jury in civil cases.
Where there has been change the right to trial by jury in civil cases is in the area
of summary disposition. This change has diminished the right to trial by jury in civil
cases, because the Michigan Supreme Court ,as presently constituted, has been more
inclined to hold that in particular cases there was no genuine issue of material fact, so
that the moving party, usually the defendant, was entitled to summary disposition. This
change has taken place concurrently with far-reaching changes in substantive tort law
limiting the liability of tort defendants. Thus, there will be more tort cases in which the
defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of substantive law, and for the same
reason, there will be a decline in the number of tort cases brought in the first place.
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The Court=s inclination to hold in more cases that there is no genuine issue of
material fact, justifying summary disposition, as well as the Court=s making far-reaching
changes in substantive tort law, is due in large part to the changing composition of the
Court. Beginning in 1999, the Court changed to a conservative majority, consisting of
Justices Weaver, Taylor, Corrigan, Young, and Markman, with Justices Cavanagh and
Kelly as the liberal minority. 54 With respect to summary disposition, our review of the
reported cases 55 shows that pre-1999, there were 17reported opinions dealing with
summary disposition. In 7 of these cases, the Court held that summary disposition was
proper, and in 10 of them, the Court held that it was not. 56 In the period from 19992006, there were 17 reported opinions dealing with summary disposition. 57 In 12 of
these cases, the Court held that summary disposition was proper, and in 5 of them, the
Court held that it was not. In the period from 2005-2007, there were 9 cases involving
questions of summary disposition in which the Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal,
reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeals. In 6 of these cases, the Court reversed
a decision of the Court of Appeals denying a motion for summary disposition, and in 3 of
these cases, the Court reversed a decision of the Court of Appeals granting a motion for
summary disposition.
In the area of directed verdicts, the research showed that in the period from
2000-2005, there 5 such cases reaching the Supreme Court. 58 In 4 of them, the Court
54
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for purposes of the study. In one case, the Court ordered summary disposition for the plaintiff. In
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held that a directed verdict should have been granted.
The conclusion that emerges from the 20 year study of the reported decisions of
the Michigan Supreme Court in the areas of summary disposition and directed verdicts
is that the Court, as currently constituted, has diminished the right to trial by jury in civil
cases in Michigan. The Court is more inclined than it was prior to 1999 to hold in more
cases that there is no genuine issue of material fact, justifying summary disposition, and
has now heard cases in which it has held that the defendant is entitled to a directed
verdict. And the fact that the Court is more inclined to uphold the granting of summary
disposition and directed verdicts is likely to have a demonstrable impact on these kinds
cases when they are presented to the Court of Appeals and the trial courts. These
courts, following the precedents of the Supreme Court and the results of the cases
coming before that Court, will be more likely to rule in favor of granting motions for
summary disposition and motions for directed verdicts.
However, this conclusion need some qualification. In the first place, the Court, as
constituted prior to 1999, also held in a number of cases that summary disposition was
proper. The difference is that the Court, as constituted after 1999, is inclined to so hold
in a larger proportion of the cases coming before it. And in the last few years, in
reversing decisions of the Court of Appeals in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Court
has reversed more decisions denying summary disposition than decisions granting it.
Second, the Court, as presently constituted, is not completely one-sided. There are still
cases, albeit fewer in number, where the Court has ruled against the granting of
summary disposition or of a directed verdict.
The Court=s decisions in the area of summary disposition send a strong message
to litigating lawyers, the lawyers for the plaintiffs in tort cases and civil rights cases, and
the lawyers for the defendants in contracts cases. That message is to have your facts in
order before filing suit or before the opposing party is in a position to file a motion for
summary disposition. My impression from reading some of the cases in the study is that
the plaintiffs= lawyers did not plan their cases with reference to countering a motion for
summary disposition by making sure at an early stage of the litigation that they would be
able to prove the facts necessary to support their claim. Now that is it clear that a
motion for summary disposition has a good chance of being granted, the time for
proving a claim (or a defense in some contracts cases) effectively has been moved up
from the trial stage to the pre-trial stage of the litigation. In the early stages of the
litigation, the litigating lawyer must be sure that he or she has the evidence necessary to
that with the changing composition of the Court, defendants were more inclined to file such
motion and/or that decisions of the Court of Appeals involving such motions were more likely to
be granted leave to appeal by the Supreme Court.
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raise a genuine issue of material fact so as to be able to get the case to the jury.
In the final analysis, in my opinion, it is clear that the Court, as currently
constituted, has diminished the right to trial by jury in civil cases in Michigan. Given the
Court's view of the diminished role of the jury in resolving factual disputes in civil cases,
litigating lawyers must make the best of a bad situation and do everything that they can
in order to protect the right to trial by jury in civil cases. They must try to ensure in the
early stages of the litigation that their cases are strong enough to survive a motion for
summary disposition and get to the jury, and at the trial they must make a determined
effort to present sufficient evidence to survive a directed verdict. Hopefully the Court's
view of the diminished role of the jury will not have dealt a fatal blow to the right to trial
by jury in civil cases in Michigan. Time will tell how well the lawyers of Michigan have
succeeded in preserving this fundamental constitutional right.
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